Governing With Digital Platforms: A Chinese Lesson for the U.S.?
Shitong Qiao
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Can digital platforms make law and governance more efficient? Both China and the United States host some of the world’s largest digital platforms, which lead in internet technologies, provide critical digital infrastructure, and mediate private communication and public discourse. While the American experiment has stalled, the Chinese government has made remarkable progress in leveraging digital platforms to enhance efficiency in law and governance.
The study highlights China’s successes in streamlining court operations, curbing online piracy, and reshaping interactions between the Chinese government and its citizens. In practice, digital platforms have become co-governors, exerting substantial influence over public institutions rather than merely serving as conduits of state power. They have not only developed the technological infrastructure for the online processing of litigation—from filing to adjudication—but also promoted these systems to local courts and even drafted rules for the smart court regime later adopted by the Supreme People’s Court. In the area of copyright protection, Chinese digital platforms have assisted with administrative enforcement and fundamentally transformed the landscape of copyright litigation. Furthermore, these platforms have enabled not only online citizen participation but also government feedback and censorship, while exercising authority over both public and private actors in the digital sphere.
Through the lens of “governing with digital platforms,” the paper extends the existing literature on platform law, which has largely focused on the governance of platforms or by platforms. It further distinguishes this concept from “governing through platforms,” a formulation that reflects the Chinese government’s initial intentions but fails to capture the full dynamics of the state–platform alliance. At the same time, the paper underscores the risks inherent in such alliances, including constraints on individual freedom and deficits in accountability. The article concludes that, while the United States can draw lessons from China’s experience by proactively governing with digital platforms to improve law and governance, it must also implement robust accountability mechanisms to safeguard democratic values.
Rules of Origin and U.S. Tariffs on Imported Electric Vehicles: What Makes a Car Chinese?
Carlos F. Aguirre Cardenas
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This article analyzes the legal and regulatory foundations of the U.S. Government’s decision to impose unilateral tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, including the 100 percent tariff enacted under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the 25 percent tariff established under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. It focuses on how rules of origin influence the effectiveness of these measures and examines how Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers might design supply chain strategies to circumvent tariffs by classifying vehicles as non-Chinese.
From Smallpox to Synthetic Biology: The Evolving Threat of Biological Weapons and the Jus Ad Bellum
Sabrina I. Slagowitz
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Biological weapons are not new, but recent developments in genetic technology have fundamentally transformed their threat potential. Advances in genome sequencing, editing technologies, and CRISPR have made pathogen modification faster, cheaper, and more accessible than ever before, reinvigorating fears of large-scale biological warfare and giving rise to a new class of synthetic bioweapons. This note examines the implications of genetically modified biological weapons for the jus ad bellum, the international law governing the use of force. Drawing an analogy to cyberweapons, it argues that bioweapons share key characteristics with cyberweapons—stealth, latency, asymmetry, non-kinetic lethality, and anonymity—that will generate similar legal uncertainties around the use of force and armed attack thresholds. It further contends that these weapons will pressure a reinterpretation of imminence, enabling pre-emptive self-defense claims and undermining the jus ad bellum’s deterrent effect. Most significantly, this note argues that bioweapons’ capacity to alter the human genome may destabilize the meaning of “attack” under international law, while their asymmetrical capabilities may erode the jus ad bellum’s efficacy to an unprecedented degree.
Security Threats and Diminishing Market Access: Implications for Chinese Investors
Audrey Faulks
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Western countries have responded to geopolitical threats associated with China’s rise as a world power by restricting the presence of leading Chinese telecommunications companies and equipment in their network infrastructure. The past several years have seen a targeted and expanding effort by countries to remove Huawei, one of the largest actors in the telecommunications sector, from their national markets. Huawei has responded to these regulatory measures by threatening to bring arbitration claims under China’s bilateral investment treaties with several European states. Additionally, Huawei has filed a Request for Arbitration against Sweden for its exclusion from the 5G market. This note explores the broader intersection of national security exceptions and investor protections under international investment agreements through Huawei’s diminishing access to European markets. It analyzes the Huawei v. Sweden arbitral proceeding and a hypothetical arbitration between Huawei and Germany in response to Germany’s phase-out of Huawei equipment, finding that the presence or absence of security exceptions is not outcome-determinative to the success of investor claims. This note concludes that the abruptness of regulatory measures, the commercial viability of diminished investments, and the proportionality and reasonableness of a state’s response to the perceived threat of Chinese investments will serve as the focal points of dispute settlement.